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The Not-So-Simple Economics 
(and Politics) of 
Medicare Reform
Len M. Nichols 
The Urban Institute
Despite an unprecedented amount of policy attention since 1995,
the U.S. Congress has been unable to agree upon an approach to long-
term or structural Medicare reform.  This chapter will explain why
Medicare reform is important but difficult, both economically and
politically.  It will contrast the two leading proposals for Medicare
reform, from the current congressional health policy leadership and the
Clinton-Gore Administration, respectively.  This chapter concludes
with a brief discussion of a possible compromise that could be crafted
from these proposals, if the political will and leadership is forthcoming
after the 2000 elections. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDICARE
Medicare is our most sacred social contract precisely because it
binds the generations together with the promise to pay for the health
care needs of the elderly today in exchange for the expectation that
future generations will pay for the needs of the current generation of
workers.  In 1965, when the Medicare program began, only about half
of the elderly had any health insurance.  Insurers were reluctant to sell
to the elderly who manifested health problems, and the poverty rate
was sufficiently high that many elderly simply could not afford insur-
ance even if it was priced with actuarial fairness.  Public intervention
was absolutely essential for all seniors to have access to insurance and
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through Medicare, and of these, 34 million are aged and 5 million are
nonaged disabled.
Medicare is also an extremely important income support program
for health care providers.  Figure 1 shows the percent of revenue from
different types of providers that is derived from Medicare.  Hospitals
and home health agencies are obviously dependent upon Medicare, and
physicians and nursing homes are seriously affected by Medicare pay-
ment policies as well.  Thus, providers are major stakeholders as well
as beneficiaries and taxpayers.  This fundamental duality of the Medi-
care program—an insurance program for the elderly and severely dis-
abled as well as an income support program for all major providers—
makes the politics of Medicare reform even more complicated than it
would otherwise be.
THE LONG-RUN FINANCING CRISIS
Since Medicare is mostly payroll-tax or income-tax financed, there
are two fundamental sources of Medicare’s long-run financial strain.
Figure 1 Medicare’s Share of Provider Revenues
SOURCE: Health Care Financing Administration Office of the Actuary, 1998 data.
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The first is purely demographic: there were 3.9 workers per beneficiary
in 1998, and by 2030 there will be only 2.3.  The second source of
strain for Medicare is cost growth.  Medicare costs, in the aggregate
and per beneficiary, have grown even faster than health care spending
in the United States generally.   These two facts require that unless
some structural change is implemented, the Medicare program may
become unsustainable in the future.
Figure 2 puts the cost growth problem into some perspective.  It
shows total national health expenditures (NHE) as a share of gross
domestic product (GDP), Medicare’s share of NHE, and Medicare’s
claim on GDP.  As most readers know, health care is a normal good: as
incomes rise, most people and societies purchase more of it; thus, it is
not surprising that NHE/GDP has grown from about 7 percent in 1970
to over 13 percent in 1998 as the promise and efficacy of medical treat-
ment has absorbed increasing shares of our national income growth.
The relative growth of Medicare spending is illustrated through the
increasing share of NHE and of GDP that it claims, almost doubling
and more than tripling, respectively, from 1970 to 1998.
Comparing Medicare to general NHE on a per enrollee or per cap-
ita basis is perhaps most instructive.  Medicare costs per beneficiary
Figure 2 Shares of Health and Revenue Related to GDP




have grown in real terms—over and above general inflation—at
slightly more than 5 percent per annum since 1970.  Overall NHE per
capita, by contrast, has grown at 4 percent per year.  Thus, while over-
all health care costs have been rising as a share of income and in real
terms, Medicare costs have risen even faster than general health care
costs for the last 30 years.
A bit of slightly oversimplified algebra will make clear the stark
nature of the long-term Medicare financing problem.1  Let B = the
number of elderly beneficiaries, c = the expected costs of covered
health service per beneficiary, p = the fraction of those costs paid for by
beneficiaries through premium payments, w = the average earnings of
workers, L = the number of workers in the society, and t = the payroll
tax rate required to finance the Medicare program.  In equilibrium, pro-
gram costs in a pay-as-you-go insurance program like Medicare are
completely financed by beneficiaries and taxes
Eq. 1 cB = pcB + twL.
Now the total population (T) is divided into the share that is young
and ineligible for Medicare (y), and the nonyoung (1 – y) who are.
Only some fraction of the young (f) work.  Therefore L = fyT, and B =
(1 – y)T.  Substitution into Equation 1 and solving for t, the required
payroll tax rate, yields
Eq. 2 t  = [(1 – p)c/w][(1 – y)/fy].
The first bracketed term represents the publicly financed Medicare
costs per dollar of average earnings, and the second term is the ratio of
beneficiaries to workers.  The required tax rate increases with both of
these ratios.  Note that health policy can affect only two of the five key
parameters in our pay-as-you-go tax rate equation: p, the fraction of
Medicare costs that beneficiaries are asked to pay in premiums, and c,
the average covered cost per beneficiary.  
As our society ages, y will continue to decline.  So unless labor
force participation increases enough to offset this, fy will continue on
its current downward path (as it is for most OECD countries and some
developing countries as well).  Then at least one or more of three things
must happen: 1) growth in cost per beneficiary must be curtailed, 2) the
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fraction of covered health costs borne by the elderly and their families
must increase; or 3) the payroll tax rate must increase.  Clearly, the
more success we have with the first, the less political pain we must
inflict with the second and/or third.
To illustrate the order of magnitude of the problem we face, if we
hold p constant at today’s level (9.8 percent) and current growth trends
continue for all variables on the right-hand side of Equation 2, the
required payroll tax rate t will increase from today’s implicit 5.5 per-
cent to 14.4 percent in the next 20 years.2  A doubling of the current
beneficiary share, p, reduces the required tax rate in 2018 to only 13.2
percent.  Given the nature of our political discourse over the last few
years, it is hard to imagine that double-digit payroll tax rates for Medi-
care alone will ever be politically acceptable, at least not in the first
one-third of the twenty-first century.    
Reducing annual real growth in cost per beneficiary from the his-
torical 5 percent to 3 percent and doubling the beneficiary premium
share would bring the required payroll tax rate down to 8.9 percent by
2018.  As a final example, if we were somehow able to reduce the
annual real growth in costs per beneficiary to 1 percent, then we could
keep p on its current trajectory to 12 percent and the payroll tax rate
would have to rise to a level no higher than 6.6 percent.
One important inference from this set of exercises is that some
payroll tax increase is inevitable and reasonable to expect as the share
of our population over 65 increases in the first half of the twenty-first
century.  Another lesson is that controlling the rate of growth in costs
per beneficiary is the key to minimizing that tax increase, which will
surely remain a goal even as we preserve our commitment to all the
elderly.  This chapter focuses on alternative paths to reduce the growth
in c, the Medicare-covered health services cost per beneficiary.  
PRINCIPLES OF STRUCTURAL REFORM
We have established that the fundamental goal of long-term Medi-
care reform is to reduce the real rate of growth of costs per beneficiary.
This can only be accomplished by a fundamental restructuring of
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incentives for beneficiaries, health plans, and fee-for-service (FFS)
Medicare as well.
Beneficiaries must have incentives to choose lower-cost health plan
and health service delivery arrangements, or plans and providers will
have no incentive to become more efficient.  The simplest way to
impart these incentives is to take serious steps toward implementing
market principles—letting low-cost providers charge beneficiaries less,
and requiring high-cost providers to charge beneficiaries more—while
assuring that quality remains within acceptable bounds.  There may
indeed be a natural trade-off between cost and quality, but the basic
idea behind structural Medicare reform is to allow beneficiary prefer-
ences to play a larger role in defining the appropriate place along that
trade-off than they have in the past, rather than relying exclusively on
executive branch determinations and dictates pursuant to legislative
instructions.
In addition, policymakers have to define other trade-offs with effi-
ciency, like those with equity arising from income differences—price
incentives contradict ensuring access for the poor, for example—or risk
differences.  Ultimately, legislation determines how much people of
different income and health risk will pay on average, though the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) could be given the assignment
to create incentives within certain bounds as defined by Congress and
the White House together.   Finally, the complex issue of appropriate
geographic adjustment could present a set of subtle and not-so-subtle
trade-offs.  Pursuing payment and benefit equity across the country
may be impossible in a geographically heterogeneous nation like ours,
where not only payment rates but utilization patterns vary tremen-
dously as well.  We will return to geographic adjustment issues again in
the proposal section, for they are among the thorniest in Medicare
reform.
Incentives for private plans to become efficient providers of accept-
able or higher quality care would also be easier to implement through a
new pricing system than any other known way.  In many ways, struc-
tural Medicare reform is really about how to get health plan pricing
policy right.  Today it is highly inefficient because payment is formu-
laic and administered and is based ultimately on FFS Medicare costs.
This is not a linkage that promotes efficient behavior by either health
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plans or FFS providers, and thus is not in the long-run interests of
either Medicare beneficiaries or taxpayers.
A short digression is worthwhile at this point to clarify that man-
aged care is consistent with the original intent of the architects of
Medicare.  A fair reading of the legislative history of the Medicare pro-
gram indicates that the original intent was to provide our elderly with
the same kind of health insurance that most workers were offered.  In
1965, that was indemnity coverage for FFS medicine, typically through
a Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan.  Today, the private industry norm is
some kind of managed care.  Thus, Medicare actually lags the private
sector by quite a bit in moving most of its beneficiaries to managed
care.
In my view, some form of managed care is here to stay, notwith-
standing the increasingly emotional debate about patient protection
acts in the current Congress that reflects the current backlash over cost-
control techniques.  Now, some managed care policies and plans surely
need changing, but to argue that we can do away with care managers
trying to balance cost and quality in clinically appropriate ways is to
delude ourselves that 1) all health providers and styles of care are
equally outstanding, and 2) we have unlimited resources to spend on
health care in this country.  Both propositions are patently false, and
stakeholders that oppose managed care—for example, physicians who
want their unquestioned autonomy and higher incomes back, hospitals
who want to charge what they want in order to avoid changing the way
they are organized, and politicians willing to exploit a small number of
genuine horror stories for political gain—are exaggerating the prob-
lems of managed care to further their own self-interests.
That said, ensuring that quality can be properly valued in the Medi-
care marketplace will not be easy.  Advances in measurement are
occurring, but there is still much work to do by plans, providers, and
beneficiary/family education specialists alike.  This work is vital to the
future of a competition-driven health system.  But while we may wait
for the perfect set of quality measures to be devised, to do nothing and
just trust unmanaged FFS medicine to solve all our quality and
resource allocation problems is clearly not the answer either, as the
recent Institute of Medicine report shows (Kohn, Corrigan, and
Donaldson 2000). 
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Trying to make health plan pricing policy more efficient also cre-
ates two other types of trade-offs: conflicts with special missions of
providers and perhaps of the Medicare program itself, and geographic
equity.   Academic medical centers that train our future health profes-
sionals and conduct the clinical research that improves medical prac-
tice—such as teaching hospitals, hospitals that have historically
provided a disproportionate share of uncompensated care to the poor
and the uninsured, and hospitals that are the only source of medical
care in some semirural areas of the United States—all provide more or
less public goods for which competitive market forces will always
underpay.  But forcing health plans to become more efficient through
Medicare payment reform will reduce their ability to implicitly subsi-
dize these activities.  The wise thing to do would be to take the funding
for these activities out of Medicare and Medicaid and have a clear and
honest debate about how much research, teaching, uncompensated
care, and rural provider support we want to provide, and then fund
these activities directly with public funds, federal, state, and local.  But
wisdom and U.S. health policy are not often included in the same sen-
tence, and while the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 took an important
step by removing some graduate medical education payments from
Medicare payments to health plans and instead paying them directly to
teaching hospitals, providers of these public goods have strong incen-
tives to resist fully efficient Medicare pricing policy until some alterna-
tive funding stream for most of their current special activities can be
assured.
Geographic equity is also complicated by a zealous pursuit of effi-
ciency.  Basically, efficiency would require that prices be set locally at
the minimum level to attract services from efficient providers of
acceptable quality.  But given the geographic heterogeneity of the U.S.
health care system and the statutory principle that beneficiaries should
pay a premium equal to a fixed percentage of the costs of average
Medicare (ambulatory, or Part B) benefits, local efficiency would make
it impossible to charge beneficiaries the same amount nationwide.  But
absolute geographic equity—defined as spending the same amount of
money per beneficiary nationwide—would also be problematic,
because the same money would buy very different amounts of health
care in different parts of the country.  Thus, balancing geography and
efficiency requires judgment about a complex trade-off, and this issue
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is one in which the major Medicare reform proposals differ substan-
tially, as we shall see in this chapter.
ALMOST IDEAL MEDICARE 
HEALTH PLAN PRICING SYSTEM
Given the principles of structural reform, a useful conceptual
experiment might be to ignore the real world constraints on the Medi-
care program for a moment and discuss the larger features of an almost
ideal pricing system, and then examine how the constraints on Medi-
care do and do not force deviations from the ideal.
In many ways, the best example of an organized health plan pur-
chaser for Medicare to emulate is that of a large, multistate employer
with nationwide union contracts that force benefit packages to be
equivalent everywhere.  Health care, like politics, is local, and private
employers do not seem to be troubled by this; they just adapt their
health plan arrangements to fit local conditions within the context of
their company-wide labor–management agreements.  The simplest way
to start, and a way that Medicare could surely emulate, is to define a
standard benefit package that will be purchased everywhere.  In the
modern world of twenty-first century health care, that package should
include reasonable prescription drug coverage in addition to the current
statutory Medicare benefit package.  Health plans would then be asked
to bid on this package.  The government payment amount would be
fixed near the middle or lower end of the bid distribution, and benefi-
ciaries would have to pay extra out of their pockets to enroll in high
bidding plans.  This competitive bidding arrangement would encourage
all plans to become more efficient so that they could bid lower and
offer premium rebates to attract beneficiaries.  Again emulating the
best private purchasers today, Medicare would collect and disseminate
comparative quality data on plans and their affiliated providers, for this
would give beneficiaries the maximum feasible information on which
to base their enrollment decisions.  Finally, after some reasonable time
for remedial action, Medicare would exclude plans and providers who
failed to meet acceptable quality or performance targets.  
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This sort of almost ideal health plan pricing system would have
three main virtues.  First, it would impart maximum incentives for
health plans to become more efficient over time.  Second, it would
guarantee access to the same set of benefits nationwide.  This is in con-
trast to today, where beneficiaries in Miami get zero premium (above
their statutory Part B payment) prescription drug coverage through
Medicare Plus Choice plans, and beneficiaries in Minneapolis have to
pay large amounts out of pocket to get plans to offer prescription drugs
to them, all because the current payment formulas are based on local
FFS costs and practice patterns and make very little analytic sense.
The third advantage of an almost ideal health plan pricing system is
that it allows Medicare to price all health plans locally and avoid the
thorny problems of deriving and administering geographic adjusters,
which are inherently imperfect.
There are two major risks of the almost ideal health plan pricing
system.  First, while it does guarantee standard benefits nationwide, it
cannot guarantee that beneficiaries will pay the same premium every-
where for the same benefit package.  In fact, only one plan in each
region is likely to have only the statutory premium attached.  Higher
bidding plans will have to charge a premium, and lower bidding plans
can offer beneficiaries rebates off their statutory amount.  This should
encourage health plans to become more efficient, but it is not what
some analysts and advocates mean when they talk about Medicare
being available to all at one nationwide premium for all beneficiaries.
Now there are regional disparities today for both availability and price
of extra benefits beyond the current parsimonious (excluding drugs)
Medicare benefit package, and at least one plan in each area will be
available at the statutory price.  But if regional disparities in premium
payments for most Medicare health plans become too large, then a
reevaluation of the definition of the Medicare “entitlement” may be
demanded and appropriate.
The second major risk of an almost ideal Medicare health plan
pricing system is that it does depend completely on local competition
to engender efficient bids.  If that local competition is not forthcoming
(in rural areas, for example) or not sustainable (if health plan consoli-
dation leaves oligopoly or monopoly health plans in certain areas), then
some other way to generate pressures for efficiency must be found.
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CONSTRAINTS ON MEDICARE
Even if the almost ideal health plan pricing system could be imple-
mented and made to work well everywhere, Medicare is not and cannot
ever be exactly like a large multistate employer.  A private employer
can strive for efficiency with no worries about spillover consequences,
such as provider availability for 39 million beneficiaries, many of
whom are very vulnerable and some of whom are chronically ill or dis-
abled, both of which are fairly rare occurrences among working fami-
lies that employers usually cover.  
First, precisely because of these chronically ill and disabled, as
well as rural beneficiaries, Medicare cannot ignore FFS providers the
way large employers can now if they so choose.  Only about 15 percent
of beneficiaries are in Medicare + Choice plans today, thus managed
care capacity will have to be expanded quite a bit before FFS can be
allowed to fade away.  Given the preponderance of FFS enrollees
today, Medicare simply has to modernize this part of the program as
well, rather than just focus on health plan payment policy and wait to
achieve efficiency gains until all beneficiaries choose the new and
improved managed care plans.  Modernization will require selective
contracting, performance requirements, and locally negotiated pay-
ment discounts with doctors and hospitals, none of which are features
of the Medicare program today, and all of which are features of orga-
nized private purchasers who do a credible job of managing more or
less FFS delivery systems (e.g., preferred-provider organizations).
Medicare must also worry about this problematic geographic
equity because it is a national program.  There is no simple scientific
test to decide if having the same benefits everywhere or charging the
same premium everywhere is the better definition of geographic equity.
The very idea of geographic equity may be a bit problematic in a coun-
try with the heterogeneous health care systems that the United States
has.  Given that some form of geographic adjustment in payment rates
is necessary, it is also difficult to come up with factors that are truly
exogenous to local health care system demand.  For example, nurses’
wages are clearly input prices to both hospitals and doctors’ offices, so
a geographic adjustment factor including their wages makes intuitive
sense.  But nursing wages are higher where the demand for health care
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is greater, so they are hardly a purely exogenous reflection of the rela-
tive costs of providing medical care in different places around the
country.
The Medicare program must also worry about income equity more
intensely than private employer purchasers of health insurance.  Low-
income Medicare enrollees cannot be expected to bear high out-of-
pocket costs, either for health plans or for health services.  Since
approximately 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have incomes
below poverty (Moon, Waidmann, and Storeygard 2000), payment pro-
visions for protections that may impede the pursuit of efficiency must
be made.
Similarly, differential health risks, while present in relative terms
in all insurable populations, may be more of a problem in Medicare
than in other settings.  For health plans, the absolute financial conse-
quences of being saddled with a disproportionate share of the highest
risks are more severe, and thus provisions for risk adjustment of pre-
mium dollars received by plans are essential.  Equally essential is abso-
lute guaranteed open enrollment and the absence of risk-related
beneficiary premiums and co-pays so that no one with chronic or seri-
ous illness is prevented from getting medically necessary care.
ALTERNATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS
Since 1995 there have been quite a few proposals to restructure
Medicare,3  and in 1999 two major proposals emerged to galvanize the
debate and to act as magnets or centers of gravity for rather different
perspectives around which to coalesce.  I label these the Breaux-Frist
and Clinton proposals, respectively, after the leading politicians who
have sponsored them.  Breaux-Frist grew out of the Bi-Partisan Com-
mission’s plan, which was released in March.4  President Clinton’s plan
was developed as a response to the Bi-Partisan Commission plan and
was released in July.5  Specific legislation has now been drafted and
some details have been changed, though no formal bill has been
marked up in committee and actually voted on in either chamber.  Still,
the key contours I will outline have not changed, and they will serve to
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clarify these alternative approaches to long-term structural reform of
the Medicare program.
First, I will highlight the important principles that the proposals
share.  To begin with, they both have competitive price incentives for
beneficiaries, plans, and FFS Medicare.  This is one essential key for
long-run Medicare reform to promote efficiency and thus to reduce the
long-run real rate of growth of cost per beneficiary.  Second, both pro-
posals make prescription drugs an optional part of the Medicare benefit
package.  The acknowledgment that prescription drugs are central to
modern medical practice is important, even though neither drug provi-
sion is as generous as those made outside the context of structural
Medicare reform in the bidding wars for the 2000 presidential election
campaign.  Finally, each major proposal has provisions that would pro-
tect low-income and high-risk individuals, as well as address the
thorny issue of geographic cost differences.  These are important areas
of agreement, and they suggest that a compromise is possible within
this broad outline.
But the Breaux-Frist and Clinton proposals differ in their treatment
of three key features: the reference price, or the amount of the govern-
ment contribution toward health plan enrollment choices by beneficia-
ries; use of national averages to influence local competition; and
adjustment for geographic differences in price and utilization or pat-
terns of delivery of health care services to Medicare beneficiaries.
The Reference Price
Each reference price is best understood in the context of each pro-
posal’s specific and unique bidding process.  For Breaux-Frist, there
are two benefit packages: core and high-option.  Core includes only
current law benefits, and high-option adds (at least) an $800 (actuarial
value) drug benefit and (at most) a $2,000 stop loss (maximum benefi-
ciary out-of-pocket payment).  Health plans must submit a high-option
bid, and they may submit a core bid as well if they are willing to sell a
package with just current law benefits (all bids in all proposals are pre-
sumed to be for the average risk enrollee, and both proposals assume
risk adjustments will be made before payments are made to plans).
HCFA, as the manager of FFS Medicare, must offer a core bid every-
where in the United States.  This bid must be set to break even, i.e.,
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finance itself, over the year.  HCFA must also partner with any willing
private insurer to offer a high-option plan wherever firms are willing to
sell the supplemental policy to go along with its core package of FFS
services.
The Medicare board computes the core bid for each plan that did
not submit one on its own, and then computes the national weighted
average (NWA), an enrollment-weighted average of all bids for the
core plan nationwide.  For the NWA calculation, each bid is also
deflated by its geographic adjuster, as determined by the board.  (The
geographic adjuster will be explained in some detail later, for this is the
third key element wherein Breaux-Frist differs from Clinton).
The Breaux-Frist reference price is 88 percent of the NWA for core
plans and 0.88 × NWA + 25 percent of the statutory minimum cost of
the drug benefit ($800) for high-option plans, or 0.88 × NWA + 200.  If
a core plan bid exactly the NWA, the beneficiary would have to pay
0.12 × NWA to enroll in it.  If a high-option plan bid exactly the NWA
+ 1,000, the beneficiary who chooses it would pay 0.12 × NWA + 1000
– 0.25 × Drugcost = 0.12 × NWA + 800.  (This paragraph assumes the
geographic adjuster and the risk adjuster for that beneficiary are each
1.0 for simplicity of exposition).
The larger point is that this type of reference price builds in both
carrots and sticks; high-bidding plans must charge more than these ref-
erence amounts, and plans that bid less could offer beneficiaries dis-
counts.  Thus, this kind of pricing structure imparts strong incentives
for plans to become efficient or lose market share.
Clinton also has core and high-option benefit packages, but they
are structured somewhat differently than in Breaux-Frist.  The core
defined benefit is the current law package plus zero cost sharing on a
specific set of prevention benefits.  The high-option package adds a
specific outpatient prescription drug benefit (no deductible, 50 percent
co-insurance up to $5,000 in drug spending) to the Clinton core.
HCFA would add the prescription drug benefit to the “high-option”
FFS plan.  Private plans must bid a price at which they are willing to
supply each package.  Plans could also add the cost of reducing regular
Medicare cost sharing, as long as this does not increase the actuarial
value and cost by more than 15 percent.  
HCFA and/or FFS Medicare do not bid, per se.  Yet the reference
prices for the Clinton proposal are pegged at 96 percent of the local
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FFS cost for the core package and at 96 percent of the FFS cost of the
core package plus the cost of HCFA-administered drug benefit.  This
has the effect of insulating beneficiaries who choose FFS from ever
paying more than the statutory part B premium amount, i.e., beneficia-
ries under Clinton’s plan will always be able to select FFS without a
financial penalty for FFS’s inherent inefficiency at controlling costs.
However, low-bidding plans will be able to offer premium rebates to
beneficiaries, with beneficiaries getting 75 percent of the savings and
the government getting 25 percent of the savings.  In this way, the Clin-
ton reference price structure is all carrots: since FFS is expected to usu-
ally be the highest-cost plan, private health plans have incentives to bid
low to gain market share but no stick forcing them to bid low to be
competitive as the NWA provides under Breaux-Frist.
Use of National Averages to Affect Local Competition
Breaux-Frist uses the NWA as a check on local plans and on FFS
Medicare.  Breaux-Frist also uses the local bids to force FFS Medicare
to become more efficient or lose market share.  (This will become a bit
more clear in the examples I present below).  Clinton uses the FFS pre-
mium guarantee to protect beneficiaries while still offering plans the
reward of higher market share for competing successfully (at lower
cost) against FFS Medicare.  Clinton’s proposal also has plans to mod-
ernize FFS, i.e., make it more like a preferred-provider organization.
Adjustment for Geographic Differences
The third major difference between the proposals for long-term
Medicare reform is treatment of geographic cost differences.  Breaux-
Frist would adjust bids only for local input price differences.  This
approach is consistent with a particular view of utilization differences:
that they are clinically unjustified and mostly driven by ignorance of
best medical practice or pursuit of economic gain by providers.  Clin-
ton’s original proposal called for “full” geographic adjustment, which
seemed to promise to adjust for all FFS utilization differences as well
as price differences among different areas.  But the final proposal as
specified in the FY2001 budget documents defined the geographic
adjuster as an enrollment-weighted average of FFS and managed care
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costs, locally as compared to national averages, which at least allows
for managed care utilization to dampen slightly the degree for which
utilization differences are adjusted.  The Clinton approach is consistent
with a view that most, if not all, utilization differences among areas are
legitimate—more or less the opposite of the Breaux-Frist view.
The significance of these divergent views is made clear in Table 1,
which decomposes Medicare + Choice payment rate deviations from
the national average into input price and utilization sources in eight dif-
ferent metropolitan statistical areas.  I used the simple hospital wage
index to proxy input prices.  The table shows that areas that cost more
than the national average, from Trenton to Miami, could mostly have
high utilization (the Florida locations), high prices (Los Angeles and
Flint), or just slightly elevated utilization (Trenton).  Areas with below
average costs (Tacoma and South Bend) have substantially lower utili-
zation, even sufficiently low enough to more than counter the effect of
higher prices (Tacoma).  The point of this table is to suggest, however,
that the Breaux-Frist geographic adjuster will have very different
effects and be much more popular in Los Angeles and Tacoma than in
Miami.  Clinton’s adjuster, on the other hand, is likely to be the most
popular of the two adjusters everywhere, which is no doubt why it was
designed precisely the way it was.
Table 1 Geographic Disparity in Medicare Managed Care Plan Costs





% due to price 
HWIb – 1
% due to 
utilization
Miami 724.23 43.4 2.3 40.2
Ft. Lauderdale 623.63 23.5 1.7 21.4
Palm Beach 564.73 11.8 –0.5 12.4
Los Angeles 627.76 24.3 20.9 2.9
Flint 576.49 14.2 10.2 3.6
Trenton 521.93 3.4 –0.4 3.8
Tacoma 439.62 –12.9 16.3 –25.1
South Bend 415.86 –17.6 –2.1 –15.9
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of Health Care Finance Administration data.  Price defla-
tor is the hospital wage index.
a The U.S. average is $504.96.
b Hospital wage index.
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EXAMPLES TO HIGHLIGHT THE DIFFERENCES 
IN THE BREAUX-FRIST AND CLINTON PLANS
The following hypothetical examples are designed to illustrate how
the competing proposals would translate a given set of “facts,” i.e., pri-
vate health plan bids and FFS costs, into marginal prices that beneficia-
ries would pay, and thus, ultimately, into incentives for long run
efficiency.  It is not simple to construct an example that permits an
“apples to apples” comparison across reform proposals because they
have different benefits in their “high-option” plans and because their
treatments of FFS Medicare are so dissimilar—Clinton does not force
HCFA to bid per se, whereas Breaux-Frist requires it to break even
with its premium collections.  Nevertheless, the following is offered as
a first order approximation of an example that permits a fair compari-
son, and while I have made some simplifications compared to the
“actual” proposal throughout (these proposals are moving targets in
any event), I have been careful to preserve the rank order of beneficiary
premiums that would actually occur among plans and geographic
areas.
I use four “plans”: two private HMOs (Plans 1 and 2), FFS Medi-
care, and FFS Medicare with a high-option supplement (FFS + D),
where D = prescription drugs.  Both private plans offer each proposal’s
high-option package: the implicit assumption to keep the premium bids
identical under both Breaux-Frist and Clinton is that the more expan-
sive drug benefit under Clinton has the same actuarial value as the drug
benefit plus stop loss in the Breaux-Frist high-option package.   Table 2
lists the bids by each plan in a low-cost and a high-cost area.  (A high-
Table 2 Bids of Sample Plans ($)
Low-cost area High-cost area
Plan 1 6,100 8,300





cost area is presumed to have 10 percent higher prices and 20 percent
higher utilization than the national average.  A low-cost area is pre-
sumed to have 5 percent lower prices and utilization).  NWA is the
national weighted average computed under the Breaux-Frist rules.6
Table 3 shows the reference prices in the low-cost and the high-
cost areas (for the Clinton plan, the reference prices are relevant to
plans 1 and 2 since this reference price includes drugs for the high-
option plan).  Note that the Clinton reference prices are uniformly
higher in the same geographic area.  This shows the protection Clinton
gives to FFS, while Breaux-Frist provides stronger incentives for
health plans to become more efficient.  
Table 4 shows what beneficiaries would pay out of pocket on the
margin for each of the specific health plan choices in the example.
Recall that, under the Clinton plan, beneficiaries pay the Part B pre-
mium for FFS without drugs.  I proxied this amount by making it equal
to 10 percent of the nationwide FFS average cost in my example, or
$620 per year.  Note that the Clinton plan would charge beneficiaries
less for all plans in the low-cost area, and considerably less for private
plans in the high-cost area, because the Clinton reference price is so
high.  However, and perhaps surprisingly, Breaux-Frist would charge
beneficiaries less for standard FFS than Clinton.
Table 3 Reference Prices, Given Example Bids ($) 
Table 4 Beneficiary Payments, per Year, per Beneficiary ($)
Low-cost area High-cost area
Breaux-Frist 5,700 6,600
Clinton 6,642 8,943
Low-cost area High-cost area
Breaux-Frist Clinton Breaux-Frist Clinton
Plan 1 920 863 2,220 638
Plan 2 1,530 1,388 2,850 1,107
FFS 1,220 620 320 620
FFS+D 2,120 1,120 1,320 1,120
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This result illustrates the power of the NWA versus the Clinton ref-
erence price.  In high-cost areas, FFS is relatively cheap under Breaux-
Frist since it is forced to bid the national average everywhere, and by
definition the national average FFS is lower than the average cost in
high-cost areas.  The NWA formula makes FFS even more attractive.
The Clinton proposal, on the other hand, keeps the absolute price of
FFS the same everywhere, and the surprising result is that because of
the way the Clinton reference price is computed (with geographic
adjusters, not shown but available from the author on request), the pri-
vate health plans are actually cheaper in high-cost areas—to beneficia-
ries—than they are in low-cost areas.  This is in some ways an artifact
of this particular example, wherein excess utilization is more important
in defining the high-cost areas than excess prices, but as Table 1
showed, this is also a fair representation of Florida’s high-cost Medi-
care markets in real life.  
The upshot of this example is that because Clinton adjusts area-
specific reference prices for utilization differences and input prices,
whereas Breaux-Frist only adjusts for input prices, Breaux-Frist
imparts in high-cost areas much stronger incentives on high-cost pri-
vate health plans to become more efficient, or they will be hard pressed
to survive in high-cost areas.  Now high-cost areas—which are, after
all, high-cost because of their historical FFS utilization and pricing pat-
terns—are where the greatest potential for new savings lie, as efficien-
cies are sought.  Thus, Breaux-Frist imparts the strongest incentives for
private plans to become efficient in the areas where it is likely to do the
most good from a program-wide efficiency perspective.   Clinton, by
contrast, ends up protecting the excess utilization in high-cost areas by
making private plans here relatively inexpensive compared to FFS + D,
until this protection is eroded by the slightly declining geographic
adjuster over time as costs elsewhere (note the low cost area’s private
premium bids) reduce the geographic adjustment factor over time.  It is
clear from Table 4 that health plans in high-cost areas would greatly
prefer the Clinton approach.  In absolute terms, they would prefer Clin-
ton in low-cost areas as well, though relative to FFS, private plans
under Breaux-Frist are better off than under Clinton.  
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXAMPLE
In general, Breaux-Frist imparts stronger incentives for health plan
efficiency.  Private plans in high-cost areas—especially if utilization is
the main reason they are high-cost now—would have to become much
more efficient very quickly or charge such high premiums they would
likely lose business to FFS.  Indeed, the NWA calculation works in
such a way that FFS Medicare seems relatively cheap in high-cost
areas.  Beneficiaries would pay more on the margin for all private plans
under Breaux-Frist, and for HCFA’s FFS plan with prescription drug
coverage.  In the example, the NWA also works to make the out-of-
pocket cost of FFS exceed the price of the lowest-cost plan in low-cost
areas, which implies that managed care plans might be encouraged to
enter here, since they could likely compete against the national aver-
age-priced FFS plan.
As advertised, the Clinton plan protects FFS beneficiaries well, in
that FFS Medicare, offered to them for the usual Part B premium, is the
lowest-cost plan in each type of area.  In the example, no private plan
bid lower than the Clinton FFS plan, but private plans were cheaper
than Clinton’s FFS plan that includes prescription drugs.  Thus, benefi-
ciaries who wanted prescription drugs and were price conscious in both
high-cost and low-cost areas would be able to find non-HCFA alterna-
tives to their liking.  In a surprising reflection of the implications of
“almost full” geographic adjustment, the out-of-pocket premium for
the private plans with drugs is lower in the high-cost areas under Clin-
ton than in the low-cost areas.  From the point of view of encouraging
beneficiaries to migrate to managed care in high-cost areas, this is
good.  But the Clinton approach, relative to Breaux-Frist, is clearly
going to discourage managed care growth in low-cost areas.  It also
may stall significant growth in high-cost areas as well, since it will be
hard to provide the extra benefits beneficiaries want (e.g., outpatient
prescription drugs) and also to price below FFS Medicare, especially if
FFS Medicare modernizes along the lines of the Clinton proposal.  Of
course, if managed care cannot control cost growth better in the long
run, then it should not—and would not—grow relative to FFS.   The
Clinton plan does a better job overall of hedging the bet that managed
care is destined to win this competition.
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Each plan has both potential and obvious flaws.  In my judgment,
the Clinton plan’s incentives are potentially weak in high-cost areas.
Especially to the degree that norms of excess utilization are responsible
for historically higher than average costs in these areas (as in Miami,
etc.), there may be much more inefficiency to wring out of the system
than the Part B premium allows room.  Recall, the Clinton plan is all
carrots.  Thus, plans can price lower than FFS but they can’t go below
zero, and FFS doesn’t have to charge more when it’s more expensive
than the reference price, as in Breaux-Frist.  Thus, a potential private
plan premium discount relative to FFS costs—the Part B premium, or
roughly 10 percent of national average FFS costs in the example—is
constrained to be no more than $620 in 2000.
The Breaux-Frist plan, by contrast, may have too harsh an incen-
tive structure.  It would clearly be disruptive in the short run in high-
cost areas, precisely where managed care enrollment within Medicare
is highest today.  Ironically, if imposed without a transition phase as the
plan was originally drafted, it would likely kill off Medicare managed
care plans in precisely the areas where Medicare needs managed care
to help it save resources in the long run.  The complement to this effect
is that the NWA protects FFS in these high-cost areas, which is
unlikely to be wise for long run Medicare payment policy.
OUTLINE OF A COMPROMISE
These implications, relative strengths, and flaws of each Medicare
reform proposal all point to a fairly obvious compromise that might
actually make decent long-run policy sense: start with the Clinton plan
and gradually wean FFS from this much protection by lowering the ref-
erence price over time to something closer to the Breaux-Frist concept.
The wisdom of reforming Medicare deliberately as opposed to precipi-
tously should be obvious.  
In the long run, a locally defined contribution based on competitive
bidding makes perfect sense, as does making FFS Medicare compete.
But FFS Medicare must be given time to modernize, and payment
reform should not kill off any options in year one, or there will be pre-
cious little competition and reform in the long run.  It seems likely that
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Medicare will need both sticks and carrots in its ultimate pricing arse-
nal—as Breaux-Frist has—to achieve the lowest possible c (real
growth in per beneficiary costs).  It would be wise to reevaluate the
Clinton concept of more or less full utilization adjustment, though
recent work by Cutler and Sheiner (1999) suggests that zero utilization
adjustment is probably not appropriate either, and truth may be closer
to two-thirds than some people now think.  Finally, to make all Medi-
care health plan pricing reforms palatable, Medicare must work hard
on quality measures and plan accountability.  Ultimately, the limit to
how aggressive pricing reforms can be will be set by how much the
people in the United States trust the health care delivery systems we
allow Medicare to pay for.
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF MEDICARE REFORM
To conclude, it is important to remember that Medicare is not just
an abstract set of incentives that may be oddly structured for econo-
mists’ tastes.  Economists can best serve the Medicare debate  by iden-
tifying the trade-offs inherent in competing policy objectives and real
world conditions, and in analyzing the likely outcomes of alternative
incentive structures.  That is, at best, economics merely clarifies the
choices real policymakers face.  If we have learned anything in Wash-
ington during the eight years of the Clinton Administration, it is that
major health policy changes, as structural Medicare reform would be,
can only be achieved with a broad bipartisan consensus.  Only with this
consensus can entrenched interests—which will always oppose
reform—be overcome.  However, the other lesson that economic analy-
sis can offer Medicare reformers is that the cost of delay is higher
future pain (in tax rates) and hasty, ill-considered implementation
snafus and unintended consequences.  That is surely a poor enough
bargain to keep minds in Washington concentrated on Medicare
reform.
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Notes
I am very grateful to David Cutler, Mark Miller, Bob Donnelly, Greg White, Carolyn
Davis, Phil Ellis, Mark McClellan, Marilyn Moon, John Holahan, Steve Zuckerman,
Josh Weiner, Stu Gluterman, Anne Mutti, Mike O’Grady, Kathy Means, Nora Super
Jones, Jeff Lemieux, Stuart Butler, and Bob Reischauer for many helpful discussions
about the issues raised in this chapter and concerning Medicare reform generally.  All
errors remain my sole responsibility.  All opinions in this chapter are my own and do
not represent those of the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its sponsors.
1. This algebra section is taken from Nichols (2000).  I simplify a bit by assuming
there are no non-elderly disabled beneficiaries, no elderly workers, and that all
public funds are financed with a payroll tax.  Including the precise details would
complicate the algebra without changing the essential point at all, since the gen-
eral fund financing that reduces the actual required payroll tax rate also increases
the fraction of income tax revenue that must be dedicated to Medicare.  Neverthe-
less, the stylized “t” that is calculated in this simplified example is higher than is
actually required because of  current income tax financing and because of the pay-
roll and income generated by elderly workers.
2. Author’s calculations; details available on request.
3. Reischauer, Butler, and Lave (1998); Moon (2000); Helms (2000).  See also the
papers by McClellan, Cutler, Fuchs, Reinhardt, and Saving in the Spring 2000
issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.
4. The bipartisan commission’s proposal can be found at http://medicare.commis-
sion.gov/medicare/index.html.  Breaux-Frist was introduced in the U.S. Senate as
S. 1895 in November of 1999.
5. The Clinton plan can be found in the FY2001 budget documents.  Contact the
author for further details.
6. Under Clinton, the FFS plans do not bid, per se, but under Breaux-Frist they do.
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